文章：According to many analysts, labor-management relations in the United States are undergoing a fundamental change: traditional adversarialism is giving way to a new cooperative relationship between the two sides and even to concessions from labor. These analysts say the twin shocks of nonunion competition in this country and low-cost, high-quality imports from abroad are forcing unions to look more favorably at a variety of management demands: the need for wage restraint and reduced benefits as well as the abolition of "rigid" work rules, seniority rights, and job classifications. Sophisticated proponents of these new developments cast their observations in a prolabor light. n return for their concessions, they point out, some unions have bargained for profit sharing, retraining rights, and job--security guarantees. Unions can also trade concessions for more say on the shop floor, where techniques such as quality circles and quality-of-work­ life programs promise workers greater control over their own jobs. Unions may even win a voice in investment and pricing strategy, plant location, and other major corporate policy decisions previously reserved to management. Opponents of these concessions from labor argue that such concessions do not save jobs, but either prolong the agony of dying plants or finance the plant relocations that employers had intended anyway. Companies make investment decisions to fit their strategic plans and their profit objectives, opponents point out, and labor costs are usually just a small factor in the equation. Moreover, unrestrained by either loyalty to their work force or political or legislative constraints on their mobility, the companies eventually cut and run, concessions or no concessions. Wage-related concessions have come under particular attack, since opponents believe that high union wages underlay much of the success of United States industry in this century. They point out that a long-standing principle, shared by both management and labor, has been that workers should earn wages that give them the income they need to buy what they make. Moreover, high wages have given workers the buying power to propel the economy forward. f proposals for pay cuts, two-tier wage systems, and subminimum wages for young workers continue to gain credence, opponents believe the U.S. social structure will move toward that of a less-developed nation: a small group of wealthy investors, a sizable but still minority bloc of elite professionals and highly skilled employees, and a huge mass of marginal workers and unskilled laborers. Further, they argue that if unions willingly engage in concession bargaining on the false grounds that labor costs are the source of a company's problems, unions will find themselves competing with Third World pay levels-a competition they cannot win. 想请问郭老师，这题opponents观点是在第三段，但是原文和选项要怎么对照呢...怎么从观点看出态度？

请教may老师这道题的思路

老师，逻辑200题这个题，我觉得B是抬扛呀，原文说这个有关系，这个B选项说没关系，这不也是抬扛的一种吗。我选的A，是因为我觉得我当时设想的答案可以就是cliche在这个环境中是没啥作用的，不会影响elect的最终成功与否，这个A选项我觉得就是表达了我这个意思

老师，这是逻辑200题里面的，您在视频课里讲到的一点，这个less cooperative得有比较，也就是看钱和不看钱的得有比较，原文只有看钱的，没说不看钱的，我非常同意，我当时也是这么想的，所以选择了C

例题9， 间接法-4C1* 6C1 是指4对夫妻中的一对，是二个人. 6C1指6人中的1人， 一对夫妻* 1人，单位数量不对，可以相乘？

例17，如何知道剩下6人不符合电脑系，剩下8人不符合数学系？如何知道是哪些人不符合2个部门？假如题目写if none of the rest of candidates 会表意精确些？

例16， 假如数字变大，选出50本，不可能手算的，我的解题思路看右边， 4C1*6C1* 8C3， 为什么不能这么算？

例题16, 因为要求value of K. 1) 怎么变成条件到结论的推导, sufficient or insufficient? 2) 单看条件2，7平方不是K因子. 怎么会条件2成立？ 因为有6 factors.

例题17 好不清楚的点是 2n= a*b*c*d, 1)为什么要假设质因数(prime factor)里面是否有2.因为本来就是2n，而且条件1提到4个不同的质因数. 2)题目是求确切值？还是说sufficient or insufficient ? 问how many

请问这道题该怎么判断

请问这道题D选项和E选项应该怎么判断？