Many researchers regard Thailand's recent economic growth, as reflected by its gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, as an example of the success of a modern technological development strategy based on the market economics of industrialized countries. Yet by focusing solely on aggregate economic growth data as the measure of Thailand's development, these researchers have overlooked the economic impact of rural development projects that improve people's daily lives at the village levelsuch as the cooperative raising of water buffalo, improved sanitation, and the development of food crops both for consumption and for sale at local markets; such projects are not adequately reflected in the country's GDP. These researchers, influenced by Robert Heilbroner's now outdated development theory, tend to view nontechnological development as an obstacle to progress. Heilbroner's theory has become doctrine in some economics textbooks: for example, Monte Palmer disparages nontechnological rural development projects as inhibiting constructive change. Yet as Ann Kelleher's two recent case studies of the Thai villages Non Muang and Dong Keng illustrate, the nontechnological-versus-technological dichotomy can lead researchers not only to overlook real advances achieved by rural development projects but also mistakenly to conclude that because such advances are initiated by rural leaders and are based on traditional values and practices, they retard "real" economic development.

    Most pre-1990 literature on businesses' use of information technology (IT)-defined as any form of computer based information system-focused on spectacular IT successes and reflected a general optimism concerning IT's potential as a resource for creating competitive advantage. But toward the end of the 1980's, some economists spoke of a"productivity paradox"; despite huge IT investments, most notably in the service sectors, productivity stagnated. In the retail industry, for example, in which IT had been widely adopted during the 1980's, productivity (average output per hour) rose at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent between 1973 and 1989, compared with 2.4 percent in the preceding 25-year period. Proponents of IT argued that it takes both time and a critical mass of investment for IT to yield benefits, and some suggested that growth figures for the 1990's proved these benefits were finally being realized. They also argued that measures of productivity ignore what would have happened without investments in IT productivity gains might have been even lower. There were even claims that IT had improved the performance of the service sector significantly, although macroeconomic measures of productivity did not reflect the improvement.

    But some observers questioned why, if IT had conferred economic value, it did not produce direct competitive advantages for individual firms. Resource-based theory offers an answer, asserting that, in general, firms gain competitive advantages by accumulating resources that are economically valuable, relatively scarce, and not easily replicated. According to a recent study of retail firms, which confirmed that IT has become pervasive and relatively easy to acquire, IT by itself appeared to have conferred little advantage. In fact, though little evidence of any direct effect was found, the frequent negative correlations between IT and performance suggested that IT had probably weakened some firms' competitive positions. However, firms' human resources, in and of themselves, did explain improved performance, and some firms gained IT-related advantages by merging IT with complementary resources, particularly human resources. The findings support the notion, founded in resource-based theory, that competitive advantages do not arise from easily replicated resources, no matter how impressive or economically valuable they may be, but from complex, intangible resources.