The majority of successful senior managers do not closely follow the classical rational model of first clarifying goals, assessing the problem, formulating options, estimating likelihoods of success, making a decision, and only then taking action to implement the decision. Rather, in their day-by-day tactical maneuvers, these senior executives rely on what is vaguely termed "intuition" to manage a network of interrelated problems that require them to deal with ambiguity, inconsistency, novelty, and surprise; and to integrate action into the process of thinking.

Generations of writers on management have recognized that some practicing managers rely heavily on intuition. In general, however, such writers display a poor grasp of what intuition is. Some see it as the opposite of rationality; others view it as an excuse for capriciousness.

Isenberg’s recent research on the cognitive processes of senior managers reveals that managers’ intuition is neither of these. Rather, senior managers use intuition in at least five distinct ways. First, they intuitively sense when a problem exists. Second, managers rely on intuition to perform well-learned behavior patterns rapidly. This intuition is not arbitrary or irrational, but is based on years of painstaking practice and hands-on experience that build skills. A third function of intuition is to synthesize isolated bits of data and practice into an integrated picture, often in an "Aha!" experience. Fourth, some managers use intuition as a check on the results of more rational analysis. Most senior executives are familiar with the formal decision analysis models and tools, and those who use such systematic methods for reaching decisions are occasionally leery of solutions suggested by these methods which run counter to their sense of the correct course of action. Finally, managers can use intuition to bypass in-depth analysis and move rapidly to engender a plausible solution. Used in this way, intuition is an almost instantaneous cognitive process in which a manager recognizes familiar patterns.

One of the implications of the intuitive style of executive management is that "thinking" is inseparable from acting. Since managers often "know" what is right before they can analyze and explain it, they frequently act first and explain later. Analysis is inextricably tied to action in thinking/acting cycles, in which managers develop thoughts about their companies and organizations not by analyzing a problematic situation and then acting, but by acting and analyzing in close concert. Given the great uncertainty of many of the management issues that they face, senior managers often instigate a course of action simply to learn more about an issue. They then use the results of the action to develop a more complete understanding of the issue. One implication of thinking/acting cycles is that action is often part of defining the problem, not just of implementing the solution.

The general density dependence model can be applied to explain the founding of specialist firms (those attempting to serve a narrow target market). According to this model, specialist foundings hinge on the interplay between legitimation and competitive forces, both of which are functions of the density (total number) of firms in a particular specialist population. Legitimation occurs as a new type of firm moves from being viewed as unfamiliar to being viewed as a natural way to organize. At low density levels, each founding increases legitimation, reducing barriers to entry and easing subsequent foundings. Competition occurs because the resources that firms seek--customers, suppliers, and employees--are limited, but as long as density is low relative to plentiful resources, the addition of another firm has a negligible impact on the intensity of competition. At high density levels, however, competitive effects outweigh legitimation effects, discouraging foundings. The more numerous the competitors, the fiercer the competition will be and the smaller will be the incentive for new firms to enter the field.

While several studies have found a significant correspondence between the density dependence model and actual patterns of foundings, other studies have found patterns not consistent with the model. A possible explanation for this inconsistency is that legitimation and competitive forces transcend national boundaries, while studies typically restrict their analysis to the national level. Thus a national-level analysis can understate the true legitimation and competitive forces as well as the number of foundings in an industry that is internationally integrated. Many industries are or are becoming international, and since media and information easily cross national borders, so should legitimation and its effects on overseas foundings. For example, if a type of firm becomes established in the United States, that information transcends borders, reduces uncertainties, and helps foundings of that type of firm in other countries. Even within national contexts, studies have found more support for the density dependence model when they employ broader geographic units of analysis--for example, finding that the model's operation is seen more clearly at the state and national levels than at city levels.