Some historians contend that conditions in the United States during the Second World War gave rise to a dynamic wartime alliance between trade unions and the African American community, an alliance that advanced the cause of civil rights. They conclude that the postwar demise of this vital alliance constituted a lost opportunity for the civil rights movement that followed the war. Other scholars, however, have portrayed organized labor as defending all along the relatively privileged position of White workers relative to African American workers. Clearly, these two perspectives are not easily reconcilable, but the historical reality is not reducible to one or the other. Unions faced a choice between either maintaining the prewar status quo or promoting a more inclusive approach that sought for all members the right to participate in the internal affairs of unions, access to skilled and high-paying positions within the occupational hierarchy, and protection against management's arbitrary authority in the workplace. While union representatives often voiced this inclusive ideal, in practice unions far more often favored entrenched interests. The accelerating development of the civil rights movement following the Second World War exacerbated the unions' dilemma, forcing trade unionists to confront contradictions in their own practices.

    Many managers are influenced by dangerous myths about pay that lead to counterproductive decisions about how their companies compensate employees. One such myth is that labor rates, the rate per hour paid to workers, are identical with labor costs, the money spent on labor in relation to the productivity of the labor force. This myth leads to the assumption that a company can simply lower its labor costs by cutting wages. But labor costs and labor rates are not in fact the same: one company could pay its workers considerably more than another and yet have lower labor costs if that company's productivity were higher due to the talent of its workforce, the efficiency of its work processes, or other factors. The confusion of costs with rates persists partly because labor rates are a convenient target for managers who want to make an impact on their company's budgets. Because labor rates are highly visible, managers can easily compare their company's rates with those of competitors. Furthermore, labor rates often appear to be a company's most malleable financial variable: cutting wages appears an easier way to control costs than such options as reconfiguring work processes or altering product design.

    The myth that labor rates and labor costs are equivalent is supported by business journalists, who frequently confound the two. For example, prominent business journals often remark on the "high" cost of German labor, citing as evidence the average amount paid to German workers. The myth is also perpetuated by the compensation consulting industry, which has its own incentives to keep such myths alive. First, although some of these consulting firms have recently broadened their practices beyond the area of compensation, their mainstay continues to be advising companies on changing their compensation practices. Suggesting that a company's performance can be improved in some other way than by altering its pay system may be empirically correct but contrary to the consultants' interests. Furthermore, changes to the compensation system may appear to be simpler to implement than changes to other aspects of an organization, so managers are more likely to find such advice from consultants palatable. Finally, to the extant that changes in compensation create new problems, the consultants will continue to have work solving the problems that result from their advice.

    Jon Clark's study of the effect of the modernization of a telephone exchange on exchange maintenance work and workers is a solid contribution to a debate that encompasses two lively issues in the history and sociology of technology: technological determinism and social constructivism. Clark makes the point that the characteristics of a technology have a decisive influence on job skills and work organization. Put more strongly, technology can be a primary determinant of social and managerial organization. Clark believes this possibility has been obscured by the recent sociological fashion, exemplified by Braverman's analysis, that emphasizes the way machinery reflects social choices. For Braverman, the shape of a technological system is subordinate to the manager's desire to wrest control of the labor process from the workers. Technological change is construed as the outcome of negotiations among interested parties who seek to incorporate their own interests into the design and configuration of the machinery. This position represents the new mainstream called social constructivism.

    The constructivists gain acceptance by misrepresenting technological determinism: technological determinists are supposed to believe, for example, that machinery imposes appropriate forms of order on society. The alternative to constructivism, in other words, is to view technology as existing outside society, capable of directly influencing skills and work organization. Clark refutes the extremes of the constructivists by both theoretical and empirical arguments. Theoretically he defines "technology" in terms of relationships between social and technical variables. Attempts to reduce the meaning of technology to cold, hard metal are bound to fail, for machinery is just scrap unless it is organized functionally and supported by appropriate systems of operation and maintenance. At the empirical level Clark shows how a change at the telephone exchange from maintenance-intensive electromechanical switches to semielectronic switching systems altered work tasks, skills, training opportunities, administration, and organization of workers. Some changes Clark attributes to the particular way management and labor unions negotiated the introduction of the technology, whereas others are seen as arising from the capabilities and nature of the technology itself. Thus Clark helps answer the question: "When is social choice decisive and when are the concrete characteristics of technology more important?"

    In addition to conventional galaxies, the universe contains very dim galaxies that until recently went unnoticed by astronomers. Possibly as numerous as conventional galaxies, these galaxies have the same general shape and even the same approximate number of stars as a common type of conventional galaxy, the spiral, but tend to be much larger. Because these galaxies' mass is spread out over larger areas, they have far fewer stars per unit volume than do conventional galaxies. Apparently these low-surface-brightness galaxies, as they are called, take much longer than conventional galaxies to condense their primordial gas and convert it to stars—that is, they evolve much more slowly.

    These galaxies may constitute an answer to the longstanding puzzle of the missing baryonic mass in the universe. Baryons—subatomic particles that are generally protons or neutrons—are the source of stellar, and therefore galactic, luminosity, and so their numbers can be estimated based on how luminous galaxies are. However, the amount of helium in the universe, as measured by spectroscopy, suggests that there are far more baryons in the universe than estimates based on galactic luminosity indicate. Astronomers have long speculated that the missing baryonic mass might eventually be discovered in intergalactic space or as some large population of galaxies that are difficult to detect.