Over the last 150 years, large stretches of salmon habitat have been eliminated by human activity: mining, livestock grazing, timber harvesting, and agriculture as well as recreational and urban development. The numerical effect is obvious: there are fewer salmon in degraded regions than in pristine ones; however, habitat loss also has the potential to reduce genetic diversity. This is most evident in cases where it results in the extinction of entire salmon populations. Indeed, most analysts believe that some kind of environmental degradation underlies the demise of many extinct salmon populations. Although some rivers have been recolonized, the unique genes of the original populations have been lost.

    Large-scale disturbances in one locale also have the potential to alter the genetic structure of populations in neighboring areas, even if those areas have pristine habitats. Why? Although the homing instinct of salmon to their natal stream is strong, a fraction of the fish returning from the sea(rarely more than 15 percent) stray and spawn in nearby streams. Low levels of straying are crucial, since the process provides a source of novel genes and a mechanism by which a location can be repopulated should the fish there disappear. Yet high rates of straying can be problematic because misdirected fish may interbreed with the existing stock to such a degree that any local adaptations that are present become diluted. Straying rates remain relatively low when environmental conditions are stable, but can increase dramatically when streams suffer severe disturbance. The 1980 volcanic eruption of Mount Saint Helens, for example, sent mud and debris into several tributaries of the Columbia River. For the next couple of years, steelhead trout (a species included among the salmonids) returning from the sea to spawn were forced to find alternative streams. As a consequence, their rates of straying, initially 16 percent, rose to more than 40 percent overall.

    Although no one has quantified changes in the rate of straying as a result of the disturbances caused by humans, there is no reason to suspect that the effect would be qualitatively different than what was seen in the aftermath of the Mount Saint Helens eruption. Such a dramatic increase in straying from damaged areas to more pristine streams results in substantial gene flow, which can in turn lower the overall fitness of subsequent generations.

(This passage is excerpted from material published in a1997.)

    Whereas United States economic productivity grew at an annual rate of 3 percent from 1945 to 1965,it has grown at an annual rate of only about 1 percent since the early 1970's. What might be preventing higher productivity growth? Clearly, the manufacturing sector of the economy cannot be blamed. Since1980, productivity improvements in manufacturing have moved the United States from a position of acute decline in manufacturing to one of world prominence. Manufacturing, however, constitutes a relatively small proportion of the economy. In 1992, goods-producing businesses employed only 19.1 percent of American workers, whereas service-producing businesses employed 70 percent. Although the service sector has grown since the late 1970's, its productivity growth has declined.

    Several explanations have been offered for this decline and for the discrepancy in productivity growth between the manufacturing and service sectors. One is that traditional measures fail to reflect service-sector productivity growth because it has been concentrated in improved quality of services. Yet traditional measures of manufacturing productivity have shown significant increases despite the under measurement of quality, where as service productivity has continued to stagnate. Others argue that since the 1970's, manufacturing workers, faced with strong foreign competition, have learned to work more efficiently in order to keep their jobs in the United States, but service workers, who are typically under less global competitive pressure, have not. However, the pressure on manufacturing workers in the United States to work more efficiently has generally been overstated, often for political reasons. In fact, while some manufacturing jobs have been lost due to foreign competition, many more have been lost simply because of slow growth in demand for manufactured goods.

    Yet another explanation blames the federal budget deficit: if it were lower, interest rates would be lower too, thereby increasing investment in the development of new technologies, which would spur productivity growth in the service sector. There is, however, no dearth of technological resources; rather, managers in the service sector fail to take advantage of widely available skills and machines. High productivity growth levels attained by leading-edge service companies indicate that service-sector managers who wisely implement available technology and choose skillful workers can significantly improve their companies' productivity. The culprits for service-sector productivity stagnation are the forces-such as corporate takeovers and unnecessary governmental regulation-that distract managers from the task of making optimal use of available resources.

Jon Clark’s study of the effect of the modernization of a telephone exchange on exchange maintenance work and workers is a solid contribution to a debate that encompasses two lively issues in the history and sociology of technology: technological determinism and social constructivism.

Clark makes the point that the characteristics of a technology have a decisive influence on job skills and work organization. Put more strongly, technology can be a primary determinant of social and managerial organization. Clark believes this possibility has been obscured by the recent sociological fashion, exemplified by Braverman’s analysis, that emphasizes the way machinery reflects social choices. For Braverman, the shape of a technological system is subordinate to the manager’s desire to wrest control of the labor process from the workers. Technological change is construed as the outcome of negotiations among interested parties who seek to incorporate their own interests into the design and configuration of the machinery. This position represents the new mainstream called social constructivism.

The constructivists gain acceptance by misrepresenting technological determinism: technological determinists are supposed to believe, for example, that machinery imposes appropriate forms of order on society. The alternative to constructivism, in other words, is to view technology as existing outside society, capable of directly influencing skills and work organization.

Clark refutes the extremes of the constructivists by both theoretical and empirical arguments. Theoretically he defines "technology" in terms of relationships between social and technical variables. Attempts to reduce the meaning of technology to cold, hard metal are bound to fail, for machinery is just scrap unless it is organized functionally and supported by appropriate systems of operation and maintenance. At the empirical level Clark shows how a change at the telephone exchange from maintenance-intensive electromechanical switches to semi-electronic switching systems altered work tasks, skills, training opportunities, administration, and organization of workers. Some changes Clark attributes to the particular way management and labor unions negotiated the introduction of the technology, whereas others are seen as arising from the capabilities and nature of the technology itself. Thus Clark helps answer the question: "When is social choice decisive and when are the concrete characteristics of technology more important?"