Citing the fact that the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was higher in 1997 than ever before, some journalists have argued that the United States economy performed ideally in 1997. However, the real GDP is almost always higher than ever before; it falls only during recessions. One point these journalists overlooked is that in 1997, as in the twenty-four years immediately preceding it, the real GDP per capita grew nearly one-half percent a year more slowly than it had on aver-age between 1873 and 1973. Were the 1997 economy as robust as claimed, the growth rate of real GDP per capita in 1997 would have surpassed the average growth rate of real GDP percapita between 1873 and 1973 because over fifty percent of the population worked for wages in 1997 whereas only forty percent worked for wages between 1873 and 1973. If the growth rate of labor productivity (output perhour of goods and services) in 1997 had equaled its average growth rate between 1873 and 1973 of more than two percent, then, given the proportionately larger workforce that existed in 1997, real GDP per capita in 1997 would have been higher than it actually was, since output is a major factor in GDP. However, because labor productivity grew by only one percent in 1997, real GDP per capita grew more slowly in 1997 than it had on average between 1873 and 1973.

    In corporate purchasing, competitive scrutiny is typically limited to suppliers of items that are directly related to end products. With "indirect" purchases (such as computers, advertising, and legal services), which are not directly related to production, corporations often favor "supplier partnerships" (arrangements in which the purchaser forgoes the right to pursue alternative suppliers), which can inappropriately shelter suppliers from rigorous competitive scrutiny that might afford the purchaser economic leverage. There are two independent variables-availability of alternatives and ease of changing suppliers-that companies should use to evaluate the feasibility of subjecting suppliers of indirect purchases to competitive scrutiny. This can create four possible situations.

    In Type 1 situations, there are many alternatives and change is relatively easy. Open pursuit of alternatives-by frequent competitive bidding, if possible-will likely yield the best results. In Type 2 situations, where there are many alternatives but change is difficult-as for providers of employee health-care benefits-it is important to continuously test the market and use the results to secure concessions from existing suppliers. Alternatives provide a credible threat to suppliers, even if the ability to switch is constrained. In Type 3 situations, there are few alternatives, but the ability to switch without difficulty creates a threat that companies can use to negotiate concessions from existing suppliers. In Type 4 situations, where there are few alternatives and change is difficult, partnerships may be unavoidable.

(This passage was excerpted from materialpublished in 1993.)

    Like many other industries, the travel industry is under increasing pressure to expand globally in order to keep pace with its corporate customers, who have globalized their operations in response to market pressure, competitor actions, and changing supplier relations. But it is difficult for service organizations to globalize. Global expansion through acquisition is usually expensive, and expansion through internal growth is time-consuming and sometimes impossible in markets that are not actively growing. Some service industry companies, in fact, regard these traditional routes to global expansion as inappropriate for service industries because of their special need to preserve local responsiveness through local presence and expertise. One travel agency has eschewed the traditional route altogether. A survivor of the changes that swept the travel industry as a result of the deregulation of the airlines in 1978—changes that included dramatic growth in the corporate demand for travel services, as well as extensive restructuring and consolidation within the travel industry— this agency adopted a unique structure for globalization. Rather than expand by attempting to develop its own offices abroad, which would require the development of local travel management expertise sufficient to capture foreign markets, the company solved its globalization dilemma effectively by forging alliances with the best foreign partners it could find. The resulting cooperative alliance of independent agencies now comprises 32 partners spanning 37 countries.