Line	In current historiography, the picture of a consistent,
	unequivocal decline in women’s status with the advent
	of capitalism and industrialization is giving way to an
	analysis that not only emphasizes both change (whether
(5)	improvement or decline) and continuity but also
	accounts for geographical and occupational variation.
	The history of women’s work in English farmhouse
	cheese making between 1800 and 1930 is a case in
	point. In her influential Women Workers and the Industrial
(10)	Revolution (1930), Pinchbeck argued that the agricultural
	revolution of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
	centuries, with its attendant specialization and enlarged
	scale of operation, curtailed women’s participation in
	the business of cheese production. Earlier, she
(15)	maintained, women had concerned themselves with
	feeding cows, rearing calves, and even selling the
	cheese in local markets and fairs. Pinchbeck thought
	that the advent of specialization meant that women’s
	work in cheese dairying was reduced simply to
(20)	processing the milk. “Dairymen” (a new social category)
	raised and fed cows and sold the cheese through
	factors, who were also men. With this narrowing of the
	scope of work, Pinchbeck believed, women lost
	business ability, independence, and initiative.
(25)	Though Pinchbeck portrayed precapitalist,
	preindustrial conditions as superior to what followed,
	recent scholarship has seriously questioned the notion
	of a golden age for women in precapitalist society. For
	example, scholars note that women’s control seldom
(30)	extended to the disposal of the proceeds of their
	work. In the case of cheese, the rise of factors may
	have compromised women’s ability to market cheese
	at fairs. But merely selling the cheese did not
	necessarily imply access to the money: Davidoff cites
(35)	the case of an Essex man who appropriated all but a
	fraction of the money from his wife’s cheese sales.
	By focusing on somewhat peripheral operations,
	moreover, Pinchbeck missed a substantial element
	of continuity in women’s participation: throughout the
(40)	period women did the central work of actually
	making cheese. Their persistence in English cheese
	dairying contrasts with women’s early disappearance
	from arable agriculture in southeast England and
	from American cheese dairying. Comparing these
(45)	three divergent developments yields some reasons
	for the differences among them. English cheese-
	making women worked in a setting in which cultural
	values, agricultural conditions, and the nature of
	their work combined to support their continued
(50)	participation. In the other cases, one or more of
	these elements was lacking.

    To compete effectively in international markets, a nation's businesses must sustain investment in intangible as well as physical assets. Although an enormous pool of investment capital exists in the United States, the country's capital investment practices put United States companies at a competitive disadvantage. United States capital investment practices, shaped by sporadic and unpredictable changes in tax policy and high federal budget deficits, encourage both underinvestment and overinvestment. For example, United States companies invest at a low rate in internal development projects, such as improving supplier relations, that do not offer immediate profit, and systematically invest at a high rate in external projects, such as corporate takeovers, that yield immediate profit. Also, United States companies make too few linkages among different forms of investments. Such linkages are important because physical assets, such as factories, may not reach their potential level of productivity unless companies make parallel investments in intangible assets such as employee training and product redesign. In general, unlike Japanese and German investment practices, which focus on companies' long-term interests, United States investment practices favor those forms of investment for which financial returns are most readily available. By making minimal investments in intangible assets, United States companies reduce their chances for future competitiveness.

    Diamonds are almost impossible to detect directly because they are so rare: very rich kimberlite pipes, the routes through which diamonds rise, may contain only three carats of diamonds per ton of kimberlite. Kimberlite begins as magma in Earth's mantle (the layer between the crust and the core). As the magma smashes through layers of rock, it rips out debris, creating a mix of liquid and solid material. Some of the solid material it brings up may come from a so-called diamond-stability field, where conditions of pressure and temperature are conducive to the formation of diamonds. If diamonds are to survive, though, they must shoot toward Earth's surface quickly. Otherwise, they revert to graphite or burn. Explorers seeking diamonds look for specks of "indicator minerals" peculiar to the mantle but carried up in greater quantities than diamonds and eroded out of kimberlite pipes into the surrounding land. The standard ones are garnets, chromites, and ilmenites. One can spend years searching for indicators and tracing them back to the pipes that are their source; however, 90 percent of kimberlite pipes found this way are barren of diamonds, and the rest are usually too sparse to mine.

    In the 1970's the process of locating profitable pipes was refined by focusing on the subtle differences between the chemical signatures of indicator minerals found in diamond-rich pipes as opposed to those found in barren pipes. For example, G10 garnets, a type of garnet typically found in diamond-rich pipes, are lower in calcium and higher in chrome than garnets from barren pipes. Geo-chemists John Gurney showed that garnets with this composition were formed only in the diamond-stability field; more commonly found versions came from elsewhere in the mantle. Gurney also found that though ilmenites did not form in the diamond-stability field, there was a link useful for prospectors: when the iron in ilmenite was highly oxidized, its source pipe rarely contained any diamonds. He reasoned that iron took on more or less oxygen in response to conditions in the kimberlitic magma itself—mainly in response to heat and the available oxygen. When iron became highly oxidized, so did diamonds; that is, they vaporized into carbon dioxide.

    Ecoefficiency (measures to minimize environmental impact through the reduction or elimination of waste from production processes) has become a goal for companies worldwide, with many realizing significant cost savings from such innovations. Peter Senge and Goran Carstedt see this development as laudable but suggest that simply adopting ecoefficiency innovations could actually worsen environmental stresses in the future. Such innovations reduce production waste but do not alter the number of products manufactured nor the waste generated from their use and discard; indeed, most companies invest in ecoefficiency improvements in order to increase profits and growth. Moreover, there is no guarantee that increased economic growth from ecoefficiency will come in similarly ecoefficient ways, since in today's global markets, greater profits may be turned into investment capital that could easily be reinvested in old-style eco-inefficient industries. Even a vastlymore ecoefficient industrial system could, were it to grow much larger, generate more total waste and destroy more habitat and species than would a smaller, less ecoefficient economy. Senge and Carstedt argue that to preserve the global environment and sustain economic growth, businesses must develop a new systemic approach that reduces total material use and total accumulated waste. Focusing exclusively on ecoefficiency, which offers a compelling business case according to established thinking, may distract companies from pursuing radically different products and business models.