The fields of antebellum (pre-Civil War) political history and women's history use separate sources and focus on separate issues. Political historians, examining sources such as voting records, newspapers, and politicians' writings, focus on the emergence in the 1840's of a new "American political nation," and since women were neither voters nor politicians, they receive little discussion. Women's historians, meanwhile, have shown little interest in the subject of party politics, instead drawing on personal papers, legal records such as wills, and records of female associations to illuminate women's domestic lives, their moral reform activities, and the emergence of the woman's rights movement.

    However, most historians have underestimated the extent and significance of women's political allegiance in the antebellum period. For example, in the presidential election campaigns of the 1840's, the Virginia Whig party strove to win the allegiance of Virginia's women by inviting them to rallies and speeches. According to Whig propaganda, women who turned out at the party's rallies gathered information that enabled them to mold party-loyal families, reminded men of moral values that transcended party loyalty, and conferred moral standing on the party. Virginia Democrats, in response, began to make similar appeals to women as well. By the mid-1850's the inclusion of women in the rituals of party politics had become commonplace, and the ideology that justified such inclusion had been assimilated by the Democrats.

    In her account of unmarried women's experiences in colonial Philadelphia, Wulf argues that educated young women, particularly Quakers, engaged in resistance to patriarchal marriage by exchanging poetry critical of marriage, copying verse into their commonplace books. Wulf suggests that this critique circulated beyond the daughters of the Quaker elite and middle class, whose commonplace books she mines, proposing that Quaker schools brought it to many poor female students of diverse backgrounds.

    Here Wulf probably overstates Quaker schools' impact. At least three years' study would be necessary to achieve the literacy competence necessary to grapple with the material she analyzes. In 1765, the year Wulf uses to demonstrate the diversity of Philadelphia's Quaker schools, 128 students enrolled in these schools. Refining Wulf's numbers by the information she provides on religious affiliation, gender, and length of study, it appears that only about 17 poor non-Quaker girls were educated in Philadelphia's Quaker schools for three years or longer. While Wulf is correct that a critique of patriarchal marriage circulated broadly, Quaker schools probably cannot be credited with instilling these ideas in the lower classes. Popular literary satires on marriage had already landed on fertile ground in a multiethnic population that embodied a wide range of marital beliefs and practices. These ethnic and class-based traditions themselves challenged the legitimacy of patriarchal marriage.

(This passage is excerpted from material published in a1997.)

    Whereas United States economic productivity grew at an annual rate of 3 percent from 1945 to 1965,it has grown at an annual rate of only about 1 percent since the early 1970's. What might be preventing higher productivity growth? Clearly, the manufacturing sector of the economy cannot be blamed. Since1980, productivity improvements in manufacturing have moved the United States from a position of acute decline in manufacturing to one of world prominence. Manufacturing, however, constitutes a relatively small proportion of the economy. In 1992, goods-producing businesses employed only 19.1 percent of American workers, whereas service-producing businesses employed 70 percent. Although the service sector has grown since the late 1970's, its productivity growth has declined.

    Several explanations have been offered for this decline and for the discrepancy in productivity growth between the manufacturing and service sectors. One is that traditional measures fail to reflect service-sector productivity growth because it has been concentrated in improved quality of services. Yet traditional measures of manufacturing productivity have shown significant increases despite the under measurement of quality, where as service productivity has continued to stagnate. Others argue that since the 1970's, manufacturing workers, faced with strong foreign competition, have learned to work more efficiently in order to keep their jobs in the United States, but service workers, who are typically under less global competitive pressure, have not. However, the pressure on manufacturing workers in the United States to work more efficiently has generally been overstated, often for political reasons. In fact, while some manufacturing jobs have been lost due to foreign competition, many more have been lost simply because of slow growth in demand for manufactured goods.

    Yet another explanation blames the federal budget deficit: if it were lower, interest rates would be lower too, thereby increasing investment in the development of new technologies, which would spur productivity growth in the service sector. There is, however, no dearth of technological resources; rather, managers in the service sector fail to take advantage of widely available skills and machines. High productivity growth levels attained by leading-edge service companies indicate that service-sector managers who wisely implement available technology and choose skillful workers can significantly improve their companies' productivity. The culprits for service-sector productivity stagnation are the forces-such as corporate takeovers and unnecessary governmental regulation-that distract managers from the task of making optimal use of available resources.