Some historians contend that conditions in the United States during the Second World War gave rise to a dynamic wartime alliance between trade unions and the African American community, an alliance that advanced the cause of civil rights. They conclude that the postwar demise of this vital alliance constituted a lost opportunity for the civil rights movement that followed the war. Other scholars, however, have portrayed organized labor as defending all along the relatively privileged position of White workers relative to African American workers. Clearly, these two perspectives are not easily reconcilable, but the historical reality is not reducible to one or the other. Unions faced a choice between either maintaining the prewar status quo or promoting a more inclusive approach that sought for all members the right to participate in the internal affairs of unions, access to skilled and high-paying positions within the occupational hierarchy, and protection against management's arbitrary authority in the workplace. While union representatives often voiced this inclusive ideal, in practice unions far more often favored entrenched interests. The accelerating development of the civil rights movement following the Second World War exacerbated the unions' dilemma, forcing trade unionists to confront contradictions in their own practices.

    In its 1903 decision in the case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the United States Supreme Court rejected the efforts of three Native American tribes to prevent the opening of tribal lands to non-Indian settlement without tribal consent. In his study of the Lone Wolf case, Blue Clark properly emphasizes the Court's assertion of a virtually unlimited unilateral power of Congress (the House of Representatives and the Senate) over Native American affairs. But he fails to note the decision's more far-reaching impact: shortly after Lone Wolf, the federal government totally abandoned negotiation and execution of formal written agreements with Indian tribes as a prerequisite for the implementation of federal Indian policy. Many commentators believe that this change had already occurred in 1871 when— following a dispute between the House and the Senate over which chamber should enjoy primacy in Indian affairs—Congress abolished the making of treaties with Native American tribes. But in reality the federal government continued to negotiate formal tribal agreements past the turn of the century, treating these documents not as treaties with sovereign nations requiring ratification by the Senate but simply as legislation to be passed by both houses of Congress. The Lone Wolf decision ended this era of formal negotiation and finally did away with what had increasingly become the empty formality of obtaining tribal consent.